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We sometimes face political disagreements that arise from divergences about 
the non-normative factual assumptions that underlie the justification of out 
policy choices. The main question in this paper is what political legitimacy 
requires in such cases, or indeed whether there are defensible answers to that 
question.  
 A prominent case is the controversy over climate policy, insofar as this 
dispute can be traced back to disagreements about whether climate is 
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changing, whether there is a significant anthropogenic cause to climate change, 
and whether these changes now harm people or will do so in the future. 
According to a Pew Research Center survey, a total of 35% of the American 
population in 2014 held that there is no solid evidence of global climate change, 
either because they believe that it just not happening, or because they think that 
we do not know enough yet.
1
 In general, views on climate issues following 
partisan lines, with Republicans being much less likely to consider climate 
change a serious problem. If the US were to refuse to enact policies aiming at 
restricting emissions, other states might well follow suit, making the impact on 
global climate and living conditions for future generations very significant.  
 Another case concerns the use of genetically modified crops in Europe. 
Here the controversy concerns whether genetically modified crops pose 
significant risks for health and environment. A major part of the population in the 
European Union believes so, despite no regulatory body or scientific study 
having documented any such risks. According to Eurobarometer surveys from 
2010, 66% of the population in EU worried about GM food2, and 53% disagreed 
that “GM food does no harm to the environment”, whereas 59% disagreed that 
“GM food is safe for your health and your family’s health”.3 In part because of 
this skepticsm, European politicians have adopted a rather restrictive 
governance of genetically modified crops. As a result, governments and private 
                                            
1
  See http://www.people-press.org/2014/06/26/section-7-global-warming-
environment-and-energy/ 
2 Eurobarometer (2010) Special Eurobarometer 354: Food-Related Risks, 
Brussels: European Commission, p.30. 
3 Eurobarometer (2010), Special Eurobarometer 341: Biotechnology, Brussels: 
European Commission, p. 18. 
DRAFT: FACTUAL DISAGREEMENT AND POLITICAL LEGITIMACY 
  PAGE 3 
enterprises in Europe are reluctant to invest in research in biotechnological 
innovations in agriculture. Yet, this policy is controversial as it is viewed as ill 
founded and damaging as research in new plant technology may provide our 
best option to secure a sustainable and environmentally sound supply of food in 
the future with growing populations and a changing climate.
4
  
 These two cases illustrate what I will refer to as fact-dependent policy 
disagreements, to distinguish them from the more familiar value-dependent 
policy disagreements. I will say more about fact-dependent policy 
disagreements below.  Clearly, these cases of fact-dependent policy 
disagreements are important in the sense that they concern areas where the 
policies we adopt now will have tremendous consequences for people in the 
future. There are many other cases of substantive and important policy 
disagreements that are wholly or partly linked to disagreements over facts. Just 
think of policy areas involving taxation, immigration, trade, health, food, war, 
environmental protection, or energy policy. 
 Fact-dependent policy disagreements play a significant role in modern, 
pluralist democracies. While we disagree about values in such cases, we also 
disagree about the facts, though this aspect may feature less prominently in 
popular debate. Yet, the problem of political legitimacy in fact-dependent policy 
disagreements has received almost no attention in political philosophy, which 
                                            
4 
 See Nobel Laurates Letter Supporting Precision Agriculture (GMOs) at 
http://supportprecisionagriculture.org/nobel-laureate-gmo-letter_rjr.html 
(accessed August 11, 2016). 
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has focused mostly on value disagreements and proposed theories of legitimate 
coercive legislation in value-dependent policy disagreements. 
 My present concern is how concern for political legitimacy applies to fact-
dependent policy disagreements. I will present an argument aiming to show that 
under certain plausible assumptions regarding legitimacy, there are serious 
difficulties in identifying legitimate choices in such cases. This may seem 
unsurprising to political philosophers who focus on value-dependent policy 
disagreements, perhaps because it has been assumed that legitimacy-related 
concerns are irrelevant (or do not apply) to fact-dependent policy 
disagreements. I think that this is a premature response - and I briefly address 
why in section 5. If we should care about legitimacy at all, then it is by no means 
clear why we should ignore issues of legitimacy in policy-disputes that depend 
on factual disagreements. The general argument of the paper will be skeptical 
in that it argues that given plausible constraints on legitimacy it is not obvious 
that there can be a successful theory of legitimacy for fact-dependent policy 
disagreements. The paper ends by outlining various possibilities that merit 
further exploration. So, in part the paper aims to be stage-setting and 
explorative, rather than offering a solution to the problem. 
 The paper will proceed as follows. In section 2, I clarify the notion of a 
fact-dependent policy disagreement. In section 3, I outline the concept of a 
legitimate policy choice by suggesting a core role of the concept of legitimacy. I 
say more about what is required for the concept to fill that role in section 4. In 
section 5, I discuss a range of legitimizing conditions that one might suggest, 
and I argue that none of them meet the constraints laid out in section 4. Finally, 
in section 6 I offer some reflections and suggestions for further reflection.  
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2. Fact-dependent policy disagreements 
To begin, some clarification of fact-dependent policy disagreements will be 
helpful. To make the issue less abstract, I will throughout refer to a schematic 
example of a purely fact-dependent policy disagreement:  
 
Affirmers and Deniers 
A polity must decide upon a common policy in some domain. A 
substantial segment of the population, the Affirmers, firmly believe a non-
normative factual proposition P, while another substantial segment, the 
Deniers, firmly believe not-P. Everyone agrees that the question whether 
P is of vital importance in determining which common policy should be 
adopted in the domain in question. Consequently, Affirmers and Deniers 
sharply disagree about which policy to adopt, and their factual 
disagreement regarding P is the only thing that sets them apart. So if 
Affirmers and Deniers were to agree on the appropriate doxastic attitude 
to P, they would also agree about what policy to adopt in the domain. 
Affirmers and Deniers have debated their disagreement over P for a 
considerable time, and significant efforts have been made in exchanging 
reasons and sharing evidence. However, the members of the two groups 
are now unwavering in their confidence in their views. We can think of 
this as a case in which both Affirmers and Deniers hold, as a part of their 
outlook, a theory of error that serves to explain how the other side can be 
apparently rational and yet gravely mistaken.
5
  
                                            
5
  Cf. (Bergmann 2009, 338). 
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What would be the politically legitimate course of action in this case? Before we 
turn to that question, some remarks on terminology will be useful. Roughly, I 
take a policy disagreement to be a disagreement about which coercive common 
policy should be adopted in a given polity. A common policy is one that applies 
to all members of the polity, thereby affecting everyone, though perhaps 
sometimes in indirect ways.
6
 There is a disagreement about common policies 
when members of the polity have conflicting views about which policy would be 
best or most just to adopt, all things considered. We have a fact-dependent 
policy disagreement when the dispute depends on non-normative factual 
disagreements. Non-normative factual disagreements, in turn, are disputes 
pertaining to the truth of non-normative factual propositions. Two individuals 
disagree about a proposition just in case they have different doxastic attitudes 
to that proposition; say because one believes the proposition, while the other 
rejects it, or because one has very high credence in the proposition, and the 
other lower credence. By focusing on non-normative factual disagreements, 
disagreements about moral, aesthetic, and political values are excluded, 
regardless of whether these are a special kind of factual disagreement, and 
disagreements merely based on divergent individual interests are excluded as 
well.  
 Also worth noting is that in general, the specific content of an agent's 
normative views will determine whether support for a particular policy rationally 
                                            
6
  See Nagel's remarks about when coercion requires a legitimizing 
justification (Nagel 1987, 224) 
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depends on the truth of a particular non-normative factual proposition or not. So 
for one agent, a particular factual question may be very important policy-wise, 
whereas for an agent with different values, that same factual question may be 
irrelevant. The scenario of the Affirmers and Deniers avoids these complications 
by stipulating that if both groups were to agree about P, they would also agree 
about which policy choice is best: that is to say that their values do not differ in 
a way that influences their ranking of policy options. Most of our actual fact-
dependent policy disagreements are obviously not purely dependent on non-
normative factual disagreements, but for the purpose of the discussion ahead 
we need only consider a case that is. 
 It might be objected that either Affirmers or Deniers must somehow fail to 
be fully epistemically rational in their appreciation of the available evidence.
7
 So 
it cannot be that both groups are fully rational, understand that they disagree 
about certain facts, and yet continue to disagree. According to this objection, if 
fully rational, Affirmers and Deniers should realize that the existence of an 
irresolvable disagreement is an important piece of social evidence that should 
compel them to reduce their confidence in the views that set them apart, and 
ultimately agree to suspend belief.  
                                            
7
  See, for example, Kitcher who considers what he calls chimeric 
epistemology, which is an epistemology ‘including two methods of certifying that 
can deliver opposing verdicts about acceptance and rejection' (Kitcher 2011, 
157), see also (Kitcher 2008). Kitcher suggests that ‘if this chimeric 
epistemology were brought into the open and scrutinized, it would be seen as a 
very uncomfortable position’ (Kitcher 2011, 157). 
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 Though I cannot elaborate on the question here, I will assume that we 
can set this objection aside. Affirmers and Deniers may have very diverse 
background beliefs, making it rational for them to adopt incompatible epistemic 
principles, trust different authorities, or interpret the shared evidence in 
disparate ways. Affirmers may hold views that explain why Deniers are deeply 
mistaken, as well as why the fact that they do disagree does not constitute a 
reason for Affirmers to alter their view. But Deniers may have similar views that 
explain where Affirmers have gone wrong. So neither Affirmers nor Deniers 
need to have made a mistake in the way they form beliefs, despite maintaining 
undiminished confidence in their own view, even subsequent to acknowledging 
the prolonged disagreement. At any rate, this is what I will assume for the 
purpose of the present paper.
 8
 
 Another worry is that the case of Affirmers and Deniers abstracts from 
asymmetries between state action and state non-action, i.e. cases in which 
collective action is undertaken, and cases in which it is not. It might be held that 
state action is in need of being legitimate in a way that state non-action is not. 
Or one may distinguish between enacting policies involving coercive legislation, 




 In my discussion I assume that there are no such prior normative 
asymmetries between policy options, and there are a couple of reasons 
                                            
8
  See (Bergmann 2009) for a useful discussion of the social epistemology 
of this sort of situation. See also (Lynch 2010; Lynch 2012). 
9
  Thanks to anonymous reviewers for raising this issue. 
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supporting this. The first is merely a question of scope. I focus on the problem 
of legitimacy in fact-dependent policy choices, and it is a separate and 
independent question whether there are normative asymmetries having to do 
with action/non-action and coercion/non-coercion asymmetries. For the purpose 
of this paper, I will simply make the assumption that there are no such 
asymmetries in the cases under discussion. Second, I grant that this 
assumption may seem controversial exactly in the kind of cases that I used for 
illustration above, i.e. climate policy and the governance of genetically modified 
crops, as they might be thought to involve policy options that are non-coercive. 
However, in those cases, as in many other realistic cases, it is not easy to see 
how non-action or non-coercion is a realistic policy option at all. Adopting a less 
restrictive governance of genetically modified organisms would not be non-
action or non-coercion, but would be a decision to adopt a different set of 
coercive rules than the current ones. Similar for climate policy, where realistic 
policy options involve different coercive regimes, not a choice between a 
coercive policy and a non-coercive one. Finally, suppose that a fully non-
coercive climate policy exist. Presumably, this would be one that imposed no 
constraints on individual behaviour with respect to their contribution to 
emissions of gases that might contribute to climate change. Granting this, one 
would not need to justify a coercive element of such a policy, but there would 
still be an issue of somehow justifying adopting this policy, given our state of 
knowledge about the consequences of anthropogenic climate change, and this 
would raise a similar issue about how to do so when we publicly disagree about 
the facts. 
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 Yet a concern is that certain domains of life that are constitutionally unfit 
for state legislation, say matters of family life. In this paper I assume throughout 
that we consider policy questions in domains where the state can legitimately 
enact policies, and where the question thus is which of several incompatible 
policies it would be legitimate to adopt.
10
 
 I have specified an abstract and idealised case of a fact-dependent 
policy disagreement. Plainly, in real life policy disagreements are not so neat, 
and this of course includes the cases I mentioned above. Most policy 
disagreements exhibit various combinations of value-dependency and fact-
dependency. Moreover, people may of course be mistaken or insincere in the 
way they conceive of the political disagreements that they are involved in. They 
may say, and even sincerely believe, that a given disagreement is fact-
dependent, while it really is not. In some cases, there might be strategic 
advantages to framing a disagreement as fact-dependent, even when it is not. 
Or conversely, disagreements may be framed as value-dependent, when they 
are really fact-dependent, and so on. While obviously important in many 
respects, for my present purposes, I will abstract away from these issues.  
3. The concept of political Legitimacy 
I now need to say more about the concept of political legitimacy. I will follow a 
broadly Rawlsian liberal tradition, according to which contemporary liberal 
societies feature a plurality of irreconcilable and comprehensive doctrines that 
underlie disagreements about which policies are just or right. When such 
disagreements occur, the policy that is adopted and enforced on everyone 
                                            
10
  Thanks to a reviewer for raising this issue. 
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should at least be legitimate. So, despite our persistent deep disagreements 
about what is right or just, we should be reconciled by legitimate policy options. 
This is what legitimacy is all about. Even when we have different views on 
justice, we should be able to acknowledge that certain policy options are 
legitimate. And when realising that an option qualifies as legitimate, this should 
command some sort of respect, or deference, even among those who do not 
agree that it is best or the right. This, I will assume, is the core role of the 
concept of legitimacy. It is this familiar concept of legitimacy that I will be 
concerned with here,
11
 and the broader question concerns the application of 
this notion of legitimacy to fact-dependent policy disagreements.
12
 
 A number of theories of political legitimacy have been devised for the 
particular context of value dependent disagreements. These theories agree 
about the core role of the concept of legitimacy outlined above, but they 
propose different views about what the proper legitimizers are. A legitimizer is a 
property of a policy choice or of the process that led to that choice, in virtue of 
which that choice is legitimate. I will not discuss any particular theory of political 
                                            
11
  See (Nagel 1987; Rawls 1993; Wall 2002; Estlund 2007; Peter 2009) for 
this way of conceiving of legitimacy. Note that Rawls assumes that 
constitutional essentials are the primary bearers of legitimacy, whereas 
individual policies earn their legitimacy only derivatively by being adopted by the 
proper institutions in the right sort of way. For the sake of conducting a 
systematic discussion surveying all the options, I don't go along with this 
assumption. See further discussion of this issue in section 6. 
12
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legitimacy about fact-dependent policy disagreements, because none to my 
knowledge have been devised. Instead, I will discuss a range of familiar 
legitimizers that one might propose for the case of fact-dependent policy 
disagreements. The main contention will be that it is hard to identify any 
property or process that can serve as a plausible legitimizer in fact-dependent 
policy disagreements. If this is right, the underlying problem is that the core role 
of political legitimacy requires too much, or imposes constraints on legitimizers 
that cannot be simultaneously satisfied in realistic cases. I return to the 
significance of this in section 6. 
4. The core role of political legitimacy  
I will now elaborate on the core role of the concept of political legitimacy.
13
 
Some of the suggestions to be made below will be familiar from the literature, 
others will be, I hope, plausible enough to be worth considering. The basic 
question that will guide the inquiry is this: what does it require for the property of 
being legitimate to be able to fulfil its core role? I will suggest five distinct 
requirements that, combined, give more specific content to the concept of 
legitimacy. The first requirement is this: 
 
(a) The Distinctness Requirement. The property of being legitimate is 
distinct from the properties of being morally right or just. 
 
                                            
13
  I talk interchangeably about the concept of political legitimacy and the 
property of political legitimacy, but nothing hinges on this. 
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The Distinctness Requirement is indispensable for familiar reasons.
14
 As 
mentioned, we can disagree about whether a particular policy is right or just, 
while still agreeing that it is legitimate. So an agent can find a particular policy 
wrong or unjust, but concede that it is legitimate. Conversely, one can think that 
a policy is right or just, but insist that it is not legitimate. Clearly then, the 




 The core role not only requires that justice and legitimacy are different 
properties. As mentioned above, the cognitive task of identifying the property of 
legitimacy should also, in a certain way, be less challenging than the task of 
identifying the properties of being just, or morally right, or morally permissible. 
The reason is that when we find ourselves unable to agree about what is right, 
we should still be able to determine what is a legitimate policy. In circumstances 
where we disagree about the right options, legitimate options should 
nevertheless still be available, and it should generally be feasible for us to 
identify those options. We can spell these desiderata out in terms of two further 
requirements, the first of which is: 
 
                                            
14
  Cf. Wall on the insufficiency of correctness-based justification in fulfilling 
what he calls the 'reconciling function' of public justification, (Wall 2002, 387). 
See also (Estlund 2007, 99ff). 
15
  Note that despite the Distinctness Requirement, the properties of being 
legitimate and being morally right or just can be extensionally equivalent in that 
they apply to the same set of policies in the actual world 
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(b) The Determinateness Requirement. Given a properly framed 
decision problem, and a properly functioning political system, at least one 
policy option should emerge as legitimate. 
 
Note that the requirement is not that any decision problem has a least one 
legitimate option. This is because a decision problem might be ill formed, say, 
because some of the relevant alternatives are not represented. Or it might be 
that no alternatives are legitimate, say, because deliberative processes 
necessary for identifying legitimate policy options cannot be carried out. This is 
why the Determinateness Requirement only requires that properly framed 
decision problems contain at least one legitimate policy choice, and only when 
situated in a properly functioning political system.  
 One might worry that the Determinateness Requirement is too weak 
because it only requires that at least one policy option emerges as legitimate. 
Suppose that more than one policy option is declared legitimate, but that these 
policy options will affect members of the polity in very different ways. How, then, 
are we to decide between the plurality of legitimate choices? Wouldn't there be 
something distinctly illegitimate about, say, the powerful simply picking the 
option that serves their interests best? I agree that this is a concern. So, 
intuitively, in a properly framed decision problem, situated in a well-functioning 
political system, there should be at least one legitimate option, but there should 
not be more than one, unless all legitimate options are more or less equally 
good. However, as I will soon discuss, what I call the Non-arbitrariness 
Requirement will cater to that possibility.  
DRAFT: FACTUAL DISAGREEMENT AND POLITICAL LEGITIMACY 
  PAGE 15 
 But for now, consider the following requirement that together with the 
Determinateness Requirement, ensures that legitimate options can be 
identified:  
 
(c) The Accessibility Requirement. In a properly framed decision 
problem, and given a properly functioning political system, the legitimate 
options should be jointly epistemically accessible to us, i.e. we should be 
able to discern and agree that they are indeed the legitimate options 
among those available. 
 
I already noted why we need the provisos regarding properly framed decision 
problems and properly functioning political systems. The idea behind the 
Accessibility Requirement is that the mere existence of legitimate policy options 
does not suffice. We need to be able to find them, and once we have identified 
them, we should be able to agree that we have done so. It is otherwise hard to 
see how the concept of legitimacy could have the reconciling function that we 
assumed above. 
 While the previous requirements may seem uncontroversial, I turn now to 
what may at first appear to be a more contestable requirement. It seems that 
there should be a distinct functional relation between the legitimacy of a policy 
choice and the correctness of that choice:  
 
(d) The Non-arbitrariness Requirement. If (but only if) there is a 
procedure-independent correct decision relative to a given policy choice, 
then some sub-set of the properties that make a decision legitimate also 
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tend to make it correct, or constitute evidence that this decision is likely 
to be correct. 
 
The intuition behind the Non-arbitrariness Requirement is familiar from 
Estlund's work.
16  
As Estlund notes, suppose that a procedure for identifying 
legitimate policy options were no better than random, as regards chances of 
identifying the procedure-independent correct policy option (assuming that there 
is one). Why even bother to identify legitimate options and why comply with 
them, if they are acknowledged to be no better than random as regards being 
correct? How would the property of being legitimate serve the reconciling 
function if it has no correlation to correctness? So, while legitimacy should 




                                            
16
  See (Estlund 2007, 99ff) for a discussion of a similar constraint in his 
defense of epistemic proceduralism. See also (Estlund 2007, 112ff) for 
Estlund's remarks on how to spell out the notion of an epistemically good 
(accurate) procedure. 
17
  In one respect, the term 'Non-arbitrariness' is misleading. What is 
required is not just that a procedure is marginally better than random. Suppose 
that we have two procedures to choose between, both of them non-arbitrary, 
but one considerably more reliable than the other.   In such a case it would 
seem wrong not to choose the most reliable procedure, other things being 
equal. These complications will not affect the argument below. Thanks to [...] for 
pressing this point.  
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 Though a detailed discussion of this is beyond the scope of the paper, I 
suggest that the Non-arbitrariness Requirement could be specified to deal with 
the problem noted above. Recall that the Determinateness Requirement only 
says that there should exist legitimate options, leaving open the possibility that 
there are too many intuitively morally non-equivalent options. In response to this 
problem note that the Non-arbitrariness Requirement would rule out legitimizers 
that cannot distinguish between outcomes that differ markedly from one another 
by how closely they approximate the correct outcome. If a legitimizer cannot 
distinguish outcomes that are very different on relevant moral parameters, then 
it can hardly be non-arbitrary. 
  The final requirement holds that legitimate policies should command our 
moral respect. Again, this derives from the role that defines the concept of 
legitimacy. Reasonable individuals should find themselves able and willing to 
abide by what they sincerely believe to be legitimate decisions. Again, this is 
part of what is involved in the reconciling function of legitimacy. Here is a way to 
state this last requirement:  
 
(e) The Reason-giving Requirement. There is a pro tanto moral reason 
to comply with legitimate decisions, and for rational and reasonable 
agents, fully believing that a decision is legitimate should provide a pro 
tanto motivation to act in compliance with that decision.  
 
This aspect of legitimacy is obviously important, and much more could be said 
about it, though in what follows I will only add a few remarks. The main 
argument that follows concerns the previous four requirements. 
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5. Legitimizers in fact-dependent policy 
disagreements  
I now turn to the main argument. Assume now that the five requirements 
identified in the previous section identifies the concept of political legitimacy. 
The question now is what if anything could make it the case that some policy 
option or policy choice what we face in a fact-dependent policy disagreement 
has the property of being politically legitimate. Recall that a legitimizer is a 
property in virtue of which some policy is legitimate. So, the main question in 
this section is this: what, if anything, could act as legitimizers in fact-dependent 
policy choices? In the discussion below, I will propose a range of properties that 
might be candidates for being legitimizers. Candidate properties will all be more 
or less familiar adaptations from the literature on legitimacy in value-dependent 
policy disagreement. What I will argue in this section is that none of the 
proposed legitimizers appear plausible when we bear in mind the five 
requirements on legitimacy laid out in section 4. 
 First, however, we need some additional terminology. Recall that 
Affirmers and Deniers disagree about P, and it is this that underlies their 
disagreement about which policy they should adopt. Remember, we have 
assumed that Affirmers and Deniers do not hold dissimilar values that would 
cause them to rank policies differently. So by stipulation, if Affirmers and 
Deniers have the same beliefs, they also have the same ranking of policy 
options. Let us say, then, that a P-dependent policy is correct if and only if 
Affirmers and Deniers would rank it highest, had they believed the truth about 
P. Otherwise the policy is wrong.  
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 Note that this is a partially procedure-independent notion of correctness. 
Of course, correctness depends on Affirmers and Denier's preferences. But 
once these preferences are fixed, correctness depends only on the truth about 
P, and this is procedurally independent of what Affirmers and Deniers think 
about P, their ranking of P-dependent policies, or any decision-making process 
they may engage in.  
 Let us now turn to the range of candidate legitimizers for fact-dependent 
policy disagreements. Each candidate will be defined by simply stating 
necessary and sufficient conditions for a P-dependent policy to be legitimate, 
using again the schematic case of the Affirmers and Deniers. The first proposal 
is familiar:  
 
(1) Truth. A P-dependent policy is legitimate if and only if it would have 
been ranked highest, had the Affirmers and Deniers believed the truth 
about P. 
 
It is natural to think that the legitimate policy would be the one that we would 
agree about if we all believed the truth about P, and so the attraction of 
identifying legitimacy with correctness is evident. It is equally clear, however, 
why this fails to meet the Distinctness Requirement. On this proposal, Affirmers 
and Deniers could not find a decision both legitimate and wrong. 
 Moreover, conception (1) fails to meet the Accessibility Requirement. We 
are assuming that Affirmers accept P, while Deniers reject P, and this is why 
they cannot agree on what policy option is best. But it is plain that given this 
starting point, Affirmers and Deniers could not agree which policy option is 
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legitimate according to (1), because they disagree about the truth of P. So while 
(1) would in fact identify a policy option as legitimate, Affirmers and Deniers 
could not jointly agree which one it is. Hence (1) violates the Accessibility 
Requirement.  
 Consider instead an epistemological cousin to (1). Rather than defining 
legitimacy in terms of true belief, we might try to define the concept in terms of 
rational belief, or the factual beliefs we ought to have, if we were fully rational:  
 
(2) Full rationality. A P-dependent policy is legitimate if and only if it 
would have been ranked highest, had the Affirmers and Deniers had a 
fully rational doxastic attitude to P, given the available evidence.  
 
Unlike (1), proposal (2) meets the Distinctness Requirement. A decision based 
on a fully rational doxastic attitude to P is distinct from the right decision (as I 
defined it above), though they might of course coincide in many cases.  
 But there are other problems with (2). One is that (2) will meet the 
Distinctness Requirement only if we accept what is known as the Uniqueness 
Principle. This principle says that for a given body of evidence and some 
proposition, there is one most rational doxastic attitude that one can have to the 
proposition. While some epistemologists consider Uniqueness Principle 
plausible, it is far from universally accepted.
18
 But if we do accept the 
Uniqueness Principle then it seems that (2) will fail on the Accessibility 
                                            
18
  For discussions the uniqueness principle, see (White 2005; Feldman 
2006; Christensen 2007). 
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Requirement. The reason is that it will be rational for both Affirmers and Deniers 
to insist that their view is fully rational. All rational inquirers will think that they 
themselves hold the most rational doxastic attitude to P. That is, rational 
inquirers cannot rationally believe that P (accord a certain level of credence to a 
proposition P), while rationally thinking that it would be equally or more rational 
to doubt P or disbelieve P (have a different credence in P) given the available 
evidence. If this is right, we get the following. When Affirmers and Deniers are 
divided because they accord some proposition P different levels of credence, 
and yet think of themselves as adopting just the right doxastic attitude to P, then 
evidently they disagree about what the most rational doxastic attitude to P is. 
But then Affirmers and Deniers will disagree about which policy option is 
legitimate according to (2). So, even if conception (2) identifies a legitimate 
policy option, Affirmers and Deniers cannot agree which one it is. So, (2) fails 
on grounds of accessibility. 
 If, on the other hand, we reject the Uniqueness Principle Affirmers and 
Deniers may concede that they both have epistemically fully rational doxastic 
attitudes to P. However, (2) will then in many cases be unable to identify any 
policy as legitimate, hence failing on the Determinateness Requirement. Think 
again of climate policy. If affirming the existence of anthropogenic climate 
change and firmly denying it are both fully rational attitudes, what climate 
policies would then be legitimate according to conception (2)? So, if we accept 
the Uniqueness Principle, (2) will fail on accessibility. If we reject the Uniquenes 
Principle, (2) falters on determinateness. 
 Defining legitimacy in terms of true belief or in terms fully rational beliefs 
are demanding options. Consider now instead what might be called an 
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epistemically reasonable doxastic attitude.
19
 There is no widely shared theory of 
this, neither in epistemology nor in political philosophy, but the basic idea 
should be tolerably clear. Suppose we, very roughly, characterise what is 
epistemically reasonable along the following lines: S's doxastic attitude to P is 
epistemically reasonable just if S has made a sincere effort to get to the truth 
about P, has considered the question whether P carefully, has not ignored 
readily available evidence pertaining to P, has responded to the evidence by 
adjusting her views about P or by rebutting the evidence, and has made no 
immediately apparent mistakes in her reasoning about P.
20
 In our example 
above, Affirmers and Deniers might both be epistemically reasonable in this 
sense, although they adopt very different doxastic attitudes to P. 
 We might now attempt to define legitimizers in terms of the epistemically 
reasonable. One option is this: 
                                            
19
  Note that the concept of the epistemically reasonable is very different 
from Rawls' concept of the reasonable, cf. (Rawls 1993, 48-54). For Rawls, 
being reasonable is, in part, a moral property of individuals comprising among 
other things the readiness 'to propose principles and standards as fair terms of 
cooperation and to abide by them willingly, given the assurance that others will 
likewise do so' (Rawls 1993, 49). Rawls also distinguishes the reasonable from 
the rational, where the rational concerns the choices of means for ends, among 
other things. Epistemic reasonability, by contrast, only concerns the way we 
form beliefs about the world. 
20
  This is similar to views on epistemic reasonability defended in (Talisse 
2008) . See the discussion in [...]  
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(3) Reasonability. A P-dependent policy is legitimate if and only if it 
would have been ranked highest, had the Affirmers and Deniers both 
had epistemically reasonable doxastic attitudes to P, given the available 
evidence.  
 
Surely, (3) meets the Distinctness Requirement - holding an epistemically 
reasonable attitude to P is distinct from believing the truth about P. One can 
agree that a particular policy choice is based on a reasonable doxastic attitude, 
and yet think that it is nevertheless wrong.  
 Moreover, unlike the two previous proposals, (3) may appear to meet the 
Accessibility Requirement. This is so because requiring a reasonable doxastic 
attitude is a far less stringent demand than requiring either a fully rational 
doxastic attitude to P, or a true belief about P. Reaching a common agreement 
about whether certain views are reasonable or not would seem to prove an 
easier task. First, it is simpler to agree that someone is outside the bounds of 
the reasonable than it is to determine that she is fully rational. Second, 
reasonable views are not mutually exclusive in the way that views aspiring to 
full rationality are. Affirmers can freely consider their own view reasonable, and 
at the same time consider views held by Deniers reasonable as well. So, 
affirmers and Deniers might both agree that their opponents have reasonable 
epistemic attitudes to P, although they still sharply disagree about P. 
 However, the problem with (3) should be obvious. The liberal nature of 
epistemic reasonability will make (3) falter on the Determinateness 
Requirement. Once there are several distinct reasonable doxastic attitudes that 
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Affirmers and Deniers may have, it is clear that (3) may not be capable of 
identifying any policy option as legitimate.  
 One can imagine a spectrum of more or less lenient conceptions of 
epistemic reasonability. On the most lenient conceptions, many different views 
would count as epistemically reasonable, whereas less permissive conceptions 
would allow fewer views as reasonable. Suppose that a sufficiently strict 
conception of epistemic reasonability leaves very little space for a plurality of 
epistemically reasonable doxastic attitudes to a particular proposition, given a 
fixed body of evidence. This would tend to make (3) meet the Determinateness 
Requirement. But this move would bring back the problem of meeting the 
Accessibility Requirement that we saw above. Affirmers and Deniers will both 
claim that they are complying with the high standards of reasonability, whatever 
they are, and they will reject any policy proposal that excludes their view as 
being based on factual views that are outside the bounds of the reasonable. So, 
if we accept narrowing the standards of reasonableness, Affirmers and Deniers 
will be unable to agree about whose views are reasonable, and this will tend to 
conflict with the Accessibility Requirement.  
 The views considered so far propose to define legitimacy in P-dependent 
policy choices in terms of agents’ preferences, were they to believe the truth 
about P, have fully rational beliefs about P, or have epistemically reasonable 
beliefs about P. We have seen that none of these strategies are successful. 
 Turn now to a couple of suggestions that do not rely in the same way on 
the notion of a hypothetical agreement about factual beliefs. One familiar 
proposal appeals to convergence in policy options: 
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(4) Convergence. A P-dependent policy is legitimate if and only if it is 
the highest ranking common policy, given that Affirmers and Deniers 
both have epistemically reasonable doxastic attitudes to P. 
 
To illustrate the idea, suppose that my wife and I wonder where to holiday for 
the summer. We consider three options: we could stay in Denmark, go to Italy 
or travel to Poland. I prefer staying in Denmark over going to Italy, which I in 
turn favour over a trip to Poland. My wife prefers Poland to Italy, and Denmark 
comes as the option she favours least. Italy clearly comes out as the highest 
ranking common policy, considering that we both rank it as the second best 
choice. 
 Similarly, (4) asks Affirmers and Deniers to compare their ranking of 
policy options, and to pick the highest ranked option that their opinions 
converge upon. Since we assume that Affirmers and Deniers disagree about 
which policy is best, they will not have the same preferred policy option. But 
their views might coincide on some lower ranked policy option. The idea in (4) is 
that the highest ranked common policy option would count as legitimate. 
 While (4) may seem promising at first sight, it takes but little reflection to 
see that it easily violates the Determinateness Requirement. Suppose that we 
have two policy options, A1 and A2. Affirmers prefer A1 over A2, whereas 
Deniers rank the options in the reverse order. According to conception (4), 
which policy option is the highest ranking common policy? Both options have an 
equally good claim of being the highest ranked common policy, and yet they 
might be very different from the perspective of the Affirmers and the Deniers.  
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 A second, and also familiar proposal does not appeal to convergence, 
but rather to common ground or shared views:  
 
(5) Common Ground. A P-dependent policy is legitimate if and only if it 
ranks highest, given the Affirmers and the Deniers's shared set of 
epistemically reasonable doxastic attitudes. 
 
The idea behind (5) is that we set aside what we do not agree about, and make 
a policy choice based on what we do agree about. More specifically, Affirmers 
and Deniers should first set aside all beliefs that are not reasonable on some 
very permissive notion of epistemic reasonability. Next, they should set aside all 
beliefs that are not shared. Recall that we are assuming that Affirmers and 
Deniers don't have significantly divergent values causing them to rank policy 
options differently. So, when Affirmers and Deniers ground their rankings on 
their shared set of factual beliefs, they will agree about which option is best. So, 
(5) clearly passes the Determinateness Requirement as well as the Distinctness 
Requirement. Assume that if we accept a permissive standard of epistemic 
reasonability, it will be easier to identify which doxastic attitudes are reasonable 
and which are not. If we grant that assumption, it seems plausible that (5) could 
meet the Accessibility Requirement as well.  
 There are, however, two related difficulties with (5). The first concerns 
the Non-arbitrariness Requirement. Basing policies on the shared set of factual 
beliefs requires us to ignore every factual assumption that we happen to 
disagree about. Obviously then, rather than approximating the truth on matters 
that we disagree about, the process of seeking common ground will tend to 
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focus on other truths that don't divide us. The outcome of this will, at best, have 
a very loose correlation to correctness, as a correct P-dependent policy choice 
is defined as the choice we would have made, had we believed the truth about 
P. So, conception (5) would seem to violate the Non-arbitrariness Requirement. 
 The second related concern is that policies identified as legitimate by (5) 
could be vastly inferior to what all those concerned would see as optimal 
choices. Sometimes such policies may ultimately prove catastrophic, and the 
question arises about how one could take oneself to have a good reason to 
comply with such decisions. To illustrate, consider again controversies over 
climate policy. Assume that Affirmers and Deniers disagree about the very 
existence of anthropogenic climate change, and about the potential 
consequences that various climate policies might produce. Suppose that 
Affirmers and Deniers set aside all non-shared factual views, and then choose 
policies on the basis of the shared factual assumptions left intact. What will 
those policies involve? And how appealing would they be to Affirmers who 
sincerely believe that significant anthropogenic climate change is under way? 
Why should this way of selecting legitimate policy options be motivating for 
Affirmers? How could conception (5) meet the Reason-giving Requirement, 
demanding that there somehow be a reason to abide by legitimate policies, 
even if one happens to disagree about them? 
 It is interesting to note that Rawls briefly suggests something similar to 
(5).
21
 Rawls held that in public reason, citizens 'are to appeal only to presently 
accepted general beliefs and forms of reasoning found in common sense, and 
                                            
21
  Thomas Nagel assumes a somewhat similar view in (Nagel 2008) 
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the methods and conclusions of science when these are not controversial.'
22
 
There are questions about how this is to be interpreted, but the main idea is that 
when factual beliefs are controversial, they should be excluded from the realm 
of public reason.
23
 This, in essence, is what (5) prescribes: when facts are in 
dispute, set them aside for the purpose of legitimate policy making. 
 Consider, now, three familiar legitimizers that are based on the nature of 
the decision-making procedure, or the nature of certain institutions that are 
charged with making decisions. In part, such procedural or institutional 
suggestions may be plausible because the other proposals do not work. Recall 
that we assume that Affirmers and Deniers have debated their factual 
disagreement extensively without coming to an agreement, so we can set aside 
further deliberation as a candidate legitimizer. Three other processes come to 
mind and they are majority voting, delegation to experts and delegation to 
policy-makers. Let's discuss each in turn. 
 
(6) Majority voting. A P-dependent policy is legitimate if and only if it 
would be ranked highest, were Affirmers and Deniers to accept a 
doxastic attitude to P that is identified by a majority vote. 
 
Of course, it is absurd to decide by vote what the facts are. But the idea is only 
to vote about what factual assumptions should inform common policy. Clearly, 
conception (6) would meet the Determinateness Requirement, and it will also 
                                            
22
  See (Rawls 1993, 224) 
23
  See the discussion in [....] 
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make good on the Distinctness Requirement. However, majority voting will in 
many actual cases not meet the Non-arbitrariness Requirement, and will also 
fail to meet the Accessibility Requirement.  
 It is worth briefly elaborating why. As is well known from work on 
Condorcet's jury theorem, majority voting can be a highly reliable method for 
determining the truth of a proposition under certain conditions. One crucial 
condition identified in the theorem is that voters be competent with respect to a 
question. Roughly, voters should on average be more likely than not to be right 
with respect to the question they vote about.
24
 Let this be the competence 
condition. 
 There are now two crucial issues for the viability of (6). One is whether 
the competence condition is met in particular cases of fact-dependent policy 
disagreements. Conception (6) will meet the Non-arbitrariness Requirement 
only if the competence condition is also met, and it is easy to imagine cases 
                                            
24
  As is well known, not all voters need be competent. It suffices if the 
average probability that voters are correct is above average.  So probability that 
they are right should be above 0.5, provided that non-competent voters (those 
with a probability of less than 0.5 of identifying the correct answer) vote 
randomly. These details do not affect the argument. Another challenge 
concerns the independence of voters. The Condorcet's Jury Theorem requires 
that voters be independent, yet actual voters will typically not be independent in 
their views on factual matters , because they depend on the same sources and 
influence one another. For discussion of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, see for 
example (Estlund 1994; List 2001). 
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where it is not. Assume that Affirmers hold that there is a genuine change in the 
earth's climate, and that its cause is anthropogenic. Deniers reject both 
assertions. Suppose that the truth of the matter is that the Affirmers are right. Is 
the competence condition met? Will voting identify the correct factual view, and 
by extension the correct policy? Obviously, this will depend on the details 
regarding the sizes of the two groups - if the Deniers count more members than 
the Affirmers, then the competence condition will not be met.  
 But even if the competence condition is actually met, it seems unlikely 
that Affirmers and Deniers will agree that it is. Recall that we have assumed that 
Affirmers and Deniers have a persistent disagreement, and that members of 
both groups form theories about why constituents of the opposing group are 
wrong, despite their apparent rationality. So, Affirmers think that Deniers have 
been subject to manipulation, suffer from ideological ignorance, or have led 
themselves astray by wishful thinking. Deniers have similar theories about 
Affirmers. Consequently, both Affirmers and Deniers would be inclined to think 
that the competence condition fails whenever they find themselves to be a 
minority, because this is when a majority of the voters are mislead about the 
facts. By implication, we should expect conception (6) to fail to meet the 
Accessibility Requirement. The losing party will always have good grounds for 
contesting the resulting legitimizing force of a majority vote. 
 Let’s turn now to the procedure that is undoubtedly the most familiar way 
of attempting to provide practical solutions to problems of disagreement about 
fact-dependent policy options. When we disagree about the factual basis for 
common policies, we should delegate the task of deciding what to believe to 
experts. So:  
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(7) Delegation to experts. A P-dependent policy is legitimate if and only 
if it would be ranked highest were Affirmers and Deniers to accept the 
doxastic attitude to P recommended by the experts.  
 
The problem with (7) is that of identifying the relevant experts, and this problem 
can now be stated in more detail. We assume that Affirmers and Deniers 
disagree sharply about some factual proposition P, and have been doing so for 
a long time. Clearly, Affirmers will be inclined to reject the proposal that some 
individual is an expert on the matter, when that individual is predisposed to 
rejecting P, and conversely for Deniers. Indeed, in order for Affirmers and 
Deniers to preserve both their rationality and their disagreement, they have to 
disagree about who the relevant experts are. So, conception (7) will fail to meet 
the Accessibility Requirement.  
 I don't mean to say that (7) fails in all scenarios; fortunately, there will be 
cases where, though we disagree about some factual question, we can 
nonetheless agree to delegate the question to a mutually recognized group of 
experts. When this happens, conception (7) is likely to meet all requirements. 
The point is just that (7) is in no way guaranteed to succeed, and in some 
realistic cases it will not. 
 So far we have considered conceptions of legitimacy that implicitly 
acknowledge a familiar division of labour in democratic decision-making.
25
 
According to this view, democratic decision-making ideally consists of two 
                                            
25
  Such a view is commonly attributed to Weber, see (Weber 2011). 
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conceptually and institutionally separate components. One component 
concerns establishing what the facts are. The other component is about 
deciding what policies to pursue in light of the facts. The proposals for 
legitimizers assume this two-part decision process is upheld, but that factual 
input cannot be provided because we fail to agree about the facts. The 
proposals therefore offer conceptions of legitimate factual inputs to the 
democratic decision-making process, while still assuming that this is separate 
from the value component of the decision process.  
 Maybe, however, the discussion so far should lead us to worry about the 
separation of the decision-making process into a factual part, and a value part. 
Perhaps we should collapse the two, and let the value part take care of the 
factual part, so to speak. Deciding what factual input should be admitted into 
the decision-making process would itself be included under the value-based 
part of that process. Deciding what facts to use would be a political choice, not 
a decision that should be made prior to political choices. 
 This view can, very roughly, be characterised as follows: 
 
(8) Delegation to policy makers. A P-dependent policy is legitimate if 
and only if it is adopted by democratically elected decision-makers on the 
basis of whatever doxastic attitude to P they see fit. 
  
There are many ways of specifying this general strategy, but we need not go 
into the details. The main point is that according to (8), duly elected decision-
makers are free to base policy decisions on any factual view they consider 
appropriate. They need not, of course, agree with one another about what the 
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appropriate factual basis is, so differing factual views may become part of the 
negotiations of a representative body. Elected decision-makers are free to 
appoint whatever experts they like, even highly controversial figures whose 
expertise is not generally acknowledged in the scientific community. Sometimes 
when decision-makers base their policies on controversial factual views, they 
become unpopular among certain voters and risk their re-election; at other 
times not. Policy-makers might be criticised for adopting policies that ignore the 
evidence, but the policies cannot be criticized on grounds of illegitimacy. The 
outcome of the process would still count as legitimate on procedural grounds.  
 In one way the view expressed in (8) is quite natural, inasmuch as it 
solves the problem of factual disagreement by allowing democratic decision-
making extend into the factual realm, though not in sense of voting about what 
the facts are, or by pretending that these parts of democratic decision-making 
are especially prone to truth-tracking. Rather, candidates for office will be 
elected partially on grounds of their views about the factual questions crucial for 
policy making; promoting their favoured policies in light of what they take to be 
sound evidence will be part of the role that is entrusted to policy makers. This, I 
think, is close to the political culture that we actually can observe in many 
democracies, and indeed it seems a tempting way of extending the realm 
representative democracy. When we cannot agree about the facts relevant for 
our policies, then why not let elected policy makers decide which factual views 
to adopt?  
 The obvious challenge to (8) is that one can easily imagine situations in 
which the Non-arbitrariness Requirement is not met, or where either Affirmers 
or Deniers have ample reason to think that it is not met. On proposal (8) 
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legitimate policies may be very far from tracking correctness. Why should 
Affirmers or Deniers feel obliged to comply with decisions that are based on 
what they consider irresponsible views of the facts?   
 While this is surely a valid objection against (8), I suggest that the 
significance of (8) is better appreciated by viewing it as abandoning the idea of 
partially procedure-independent correctness. Above, I defined partial 
procedure-independent correctness as follows: a P-dependent policy is correct 
if and only if Affirmers and Deniers would rank it highest, had they believed the 
truth about P. Proposal (8) is best interpreted as abandoning that idea of 
correctness, and instead adopting a procedural view of correctness, according 
to which outcomes regarding P-dependent policies as whatever outcomes we 
end up deciding upon in a fair process. The correct option in a policy choice that 
hinges on the truth of P does not depend on truth about P.  
 This is, I suggest, ultimately what is involved in rejecting the idea that 
democratic decision-making involves two stages, one that determines what the 
facts are, and one that determines which policies to adopt. It is, of course, the 
distinction between facts and values that is at play here, or more precisely, the 
very different ways in which we form rational opinions about these matters. In a 
way, (8) assumes that these differences should be collapsed - the question of 
what the facts are should be treated as a sort of value question for the purpose 
of legitimate policy making.  
6. Some further reflections 
If what I argued above is correct, none of the proposes legitimizers meets all 
requirements in all realistic cases. We can try to define legitimizers in terms of 
truth or ideal rationality, but we will disagree about whose views are true or 
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rational. We might suggest that factual views admissible into the process should 
at least be epistemically reasonable, but this permits too diverse factual views. 
Hoping for a convergence in policy choices will often be indeterminate. Deciding 
upon policy options on the basis of the intersection of our factual beliefs may 
prove unable to yield sensible decisions. We can appeal to procedures such 
voting, but we will likely disagree about when voting is a non-arbitrary 
procedure. We can defer to experts, but may then be unable to settle who the 
proper experts are. Finally, we might delegate the task of selecting the proper 
factual basis for contested policies to elected decision-makers. This option, I 
suggest, really denies the idea of partially procedurally independent correctness 
in fact-dependent policy disagreements.  
 Surely, the discussion is not conclusive, and perhaps there are 
candidates for legitimizers that have yet to be considered. But enough has been 
said to warrant mentioning some general responses, though a complete 
evaluation is not possible here.  
 One immediate response is that concerns about legitimacy simply do not 
apply to fact-dependent policy disagreements. Indeed, the conspicuous 
absence of explicit attention to the issue in political philosophy might indicate 
that this in fact is a widely shared assumption. This view seems hard to sustain, 
however. Rawls and others in the liberal tradition readily appeal to the relative 
epistemic inaccessibility of the right answers to moral, metaphysical and 
religious questions, as part of the reason why we need a theory of legitimacy.
26
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  Apart from Rawls' own concern about the burdens of judgment, see 
related discussions in (Larmore 1987) and (Barry 1995). 
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The exact same epistemological troubles plague fact-dependent policy 
disagreements. So it seems that if concerns about legitimacy apply to value-
dependent disagreements, they also apply to fact-dependent disagreements.  
 Another response is that the discussion is misguided, as it wrongly 
assumes that individual policy decisions are the bearers of legitimacy. One 
might instead assume with Rawls that institutions (or constitutional essentials of 
institutions) are the primary bearers of legitimacy, whereas individual policies 
earn their legitimacy derivatively by being adopted by the proper institutions in 
the right sort of way. Accordingly, the fundamental question regarding the 
legitimacy is what constitutional essentials citizens may reasonably endorse, 




 However, this approach merely raises the question of institutional design. 
What institutional design dealing with fact-dependent policy disagreements 
would reasonable citizens endorse? Which decision-procedures regarding fact-
dependent policy disagreements should constitutional essentials demand or 
promote for them to be endorsable by reasonable citizens? The most obvious 
options, it seems, would be the institutional or procedural candidates discussed 
in Section 5: (6) Majority voting, (7) Delegation to experts, and (8) Delegation to 
policy makers. These candidates are consistent with the Rawlsian idea that the 
property of legitimacy primarily applies to constitutional essentials and only 
derivatively to individual policies. As we have seen, each of them has 
advantages and drawbacks, and it is not obvious which one reasonable citizens 
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  Thanks to a reviewer suggesting this objection. 
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would endorse. Also, one might consider option (5) Common Ground. The idea 
would then be that it could be considered a constitutional essential that public 
policy can only be justified by appeal to 'to presently accepted general beliefs 
and forms of reasoning found in common sense, and the methods and 
conclusions of science when these are not controversial.' (Rawls 1993, 224). 
So, on this view, if methods and conclusions of science are controversial, they 
should be excluded from public reason and not ground political action. So, 
rather than being misguided, the discussion above locates the Rawlsian options 
in a broader array of possibilities.  
 In response to the skeptical outcome of section 5, another option would 
be to consider the argument a reductio of the notion of political legitimacy, at 
least given the way I have specified the core role in section 4. After all, the 
proposed requirements in section 4 seem completely generic, and it may not be 
obvious that the problems will be easier to solve when we turn to legitimacy in 
value-dependent choices. Thus, in response to the problems identified, we 
might decide to give up entirely on the idea of political legitimacy, as defined 
here. 
 A less pessimistic reply, though along the same lines, would be to 
consider rejecting one or more of the proposed requirements. Brief reflection 
suggests that this is not easy. What motivates these requirements is the sort of 
mediating role that the concept of legitimacy is supposed to have. So, the 
question is whether we can imagine some way of specifying a notion of 
legitimacy that permits concerns over legitimacy to have the same role, while 
ridding ourselves of one or more of the requirements in section 4.  
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 It is not obvious how this might be done. It is hard to imagine a concept 
of legitimacy that does not conform to the Distinctness Requirement or the 
Accessibility Requirement - what work would we want such a concept to do for 
us? Consider the Non-arbitrariness Requirement that one might think of as the 
main culprit. Some of the proposed legitimizers fail to deliver on this. Should we 
abandon it? This would immediately raise the question of why we should care 
about legitimate policy choices, if they have no connection to correct choices? 
Surely, if we deny that correct policy choices even exist, then we need not worry 
about the Non-arbitrariness Requirement. Recall here that the main issue is 
factual disagreement underlying fact-dependent policy disagreements. We have 
defined correct choices in terms of what we would agree upon if everyone 
believed the truth of the factual assumptions at hand (and we made the 
simplifying assumption that we would then agree in our ranking). When 
correctness of policy choices is defined in this way, then rejecting that correct 
policy choices even exist would require rejecting that there are factual truths in 
the relevant domain. Surely, this would amount to a very extreme view. 
 A more appealing possibility is what one might call disjunctivism. Even if 
no one legitimizer meets all requirements in all realistic cases, there might, for 
each realistic decision problem, be at least one viable legitimizer. Maybe this 
would be all we need. We do not need to find one single legitimizer that applies 
across the board; it is sufficient if for each decision-problems there is at least 
one legitimizer that applies. This would adequately serve the sort of mediating 
role that our underlying concern here requires of legitimacy. 
 A few comments. First, a disjunctivist approach might encounter 
difficulties if several distinct legitimizers were to apply to the same decision 
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problem, if they also yielded different outcomes. We would then need to devise 
some sort of criteria for prioritizing the different legitimizers. Second, when our 
factual disagreements are sufficiently deep so that we are bound to disagree 
about when proposed legitimizers meet the Non-arbitrariness Requirement, it 
seems that no legitimizer would apply. Of course, we are not always so divided 
in our fact-dependent policy disagreements, but sometimes we are. So, while 
disjunctivism may be an improvement in some respects, it is not clear that it will 
solve all problems.  
 An option that may be worth exploring is what we might call non-ideal 
conceptions of legitimacy. I assumed earlier that admissible legitimizers would 
have to meet all requirements listed in section 4. Clearly, however, we could 
abandon that assumption, and instead rank proposed legitimizers according to 
their degree of compliance with the requirements listed. Even if no proposed 
legitimizer meets all constraints in all realistic cases, surely each proposed 
legitimizer can meet some constraint to some degree in any given case. 
Recognizing that no legitimizer is perfect, we may then aim to use the best or 
most appropriate one available to us.  
 A challenge to the viability of this possibility is that it will probably be the 
exception that one legitimizer will emerge as superior to other legitimizers on all 
relevant parameters. For example, a high score on the Accessibility 
Requirement would typically have to be traded off against a lower score on the 
Non-arbitrariness Requirement. Thus, taking this route would raise a higher 
order selection problem concerning the weight that should be allotted to each of 
the parameters.  
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 There is another way of taking a non-ideal turn that is worth considering. 
When introducing the concept of legitimacy, I assumed that when we disagree 
about what common policies to adopt, the policy eventually enforced on 
everyone should at least be legitimate. So, legitimacy was thought to be a sort 
of necessary condition on the all-things-considered moral rightness of a choice 
of common policy. Maybe this assumption warrants revision. Suppose that for 
the reasons discussed above, there are significant, realistic cases where no 
acceptable legitimizer can be devised. In those situations, no policy choice 
counts as legitimate. If legitimacy is a minimal requirement on any policy 
adopted, the implication would be that no policy should be adopted in these 
cases. This is, of course, absurd, and we may instead want to think of 
legitimacy as a contingent good-making feature of policy choices, rather than as 
a necessary minimal condition on a policy choice. On this view, concerns about 
legitimacy would always have some weight. If a plausible legitimizer identifies 
one policy option as legitimate, then that would be a strong, even overriding 
reason in favour of picking that option. However, if no legitimizers are 
applicable, say because of the problems identified above, then policy choices 
will have to be made on other grounds, say on grounds of expected utility, or 
direct concerns for rights or fairness. This and the above are possibilities for 
how we might think about political legitimacy in fact-dependent policy 
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